It was Bush Zionist administration which coined the phrase “Shia triangle” or “Shia Crescent” and ordered its Arab puppets in Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Lebanon, Morocco and the rest of the so-called “Sunni belt” to put a stop on the rising popularity of the Muslim leadership in Iran, Lebanon and Occupied Palestine. The Sunni world lacked religious, sincere and outspoken national leaders like Iran’s Dr. Ahmadinejad or Sheikh Nasrallah of Hizbullah. This vacuum is now being filled by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is steering secularist Turkey away from the US and Israeli domination. Since his party AKP came to power via the Western-style democracy in which both the moral and sex-maniac has equal rights to become a lawmaker or the ruler.
Turkey’s shift, though a welcome sign in the Arab world, is in the stage of in’fancy. The American and Zionist threat is stll looning over AKP government. The US-Israel-EU evil triangle is monitoring very closely the Islamist Turks within 99% of Sunni Muslim Turk population. Professor Necmettin Erbakan’s trained young politicians who are heading the AKP and are trying to extend their hands in friendship to its Arab neighbors who fought along the British colonialists to destroy the Ottoman Khilafat. However, it seems that by establishing a friendly relations with the Islamic Republic – Erdogan has lost his ‘Sunni credentials’ among the Arab puppet regimes who have long been made paranoid of the so-called “Shia Crescent”, covering Iran, Iraq and Syria. In fact, Shias are in majority in Iran and Iraq, but a tiny minority in Syria. The Zionist entity has never been militarily humiliated by Syria but the Lebanese Shia Resistance Hizbullah (in 2000 and 2006). In the case of Iran – Israel is still getting cold feet and wants Ben Obama to send American soldiers to die in Iran to protect the ‘Anti-Christs’ in Israel.
Azmi Bishara wrote and interesting analysis of the Arab-Turk relationship in weekly Al-Ahram in its July 8-14, 2010 issue.
Two interrelated factors are largely responsible for this development. The first is the lack of an effective Arab leader-state capable of championing Arab causes at the international level and in the confrontation with Israel. The second is the need on the part of self-appointed representatives of certain identities (or newly founded affiliations that have been transformed into identities) for a “Sunni state” (a contemporary Arab term that has nothing to do with either reality or history) to pit against Iran, the champion of the resistance and the Palestinian cause. In view of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s embarrassing performances on Arab causes, particularly during the war on Lebanon in 2006, the war against Gaza in 2008-2009 and the economic siege of Gaza, there is need for a country that could be cast as a “Sunni state” playing an honourable role in these matters. So Turkey’s actions are built up to signify the emergence of a neo-Ottoman state, or even the resurgence of the Islamic caliphate. Ankara’s tensions with Tel Aviv are exaggerated to the point where some forecast a Turkey invasion of Israel in retaliation for that attack on the Freedom Flotilla, whereas other minds mould Prime Minister Erdogan into the statue of the valiant hero loyal to the Arab/Muslim nation. “After all, Saladin wasn’t an Arab,” they say, as if there were such concepts as ethnic nationalism and modern nation states in the age of Saladin.
But supporters of a no-holds-barred settlement with Israel, who serve as Washington’s executive assistants in the region and dream only of being the local sidekick to the American champ (whether envoy, journalist or adventurer), are made very uncomfortable by the bold stances Turkey has been taking on Arab causes recently. They are particularly disconcerted by the combination of levelheadedness and self-respect that Turkey has brought to its performance, which translates in the popular mind into a stark juxtaposition between Turkish dignity and Arab officialdom’s indignity. Their instinctive reaction is to belittle Turkish stances and cut Ankara down to size. They cast aspersions on Turkey by means of sarcasm, that double-edged sword that often backfires against its users when it exposes their bitterness and petty jealousies (there is no reason to deny that some Arab leaders are prey to such foibles, unless one forgets that they are indeed very human creatures). Another means to deprecate Turkey’s stances is to feign academic detachment and chalk them up to the mere pursuit of self-interest and a bid at regional leadership.
Turkey is unquestionably a democracy by the standards of our region. I would even go so far as to say that if ever an Arab country becomes democratic, it would find it hard to outshine Turkey. For one, it will find it hard to be more secular than Turkey is today. Contrary to the dream of some Arab intellectuals, religion will play no less important a role in the Arab democratic parties of the future and in their political battles than it has in Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP). Incidentally, this party is neither religious nor Islamist, in accordance with its own definition of itself. Nor is this self-definition a form of “dissimulation under duress” as has been claimed by some Islamists who fondly pin some of their own dreams on the JDP. The JDP is an Islamist party insofar as it has a vision of Islam as a cultural and civilisational identity that Turkey needs to emphasis in order to recover its balance and achieve its latent potential. At the same time, Turkey is a US ally and a member of NATO. Also, the recent Israeli attack against the flotilla that apparently had Ankara’s unofficial backing was an attack against a classical act of civil protest, not against a militant operation. Under the present circumstances such realities or the actual implications of such realities elude us, because of the various lenses through which Turkey is viewed in the Arab world. Here there exists a people without a leadership that projects their frustrations and hopes onto Turkey. On the other, there is an Arab officialdom that defies the logic of nations and that is suspicious of any nation that behaves as a nation should, because that nation could offer a model for handling tough issues different from the customary approach of Arab ruling families. Such a dilemma leaves precious little space in the public sphere for a rational analysis of the Turkish role in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, my purpose here is precisely that — at least a stab at it……..